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Abstract 
A large number of mission critical applications 
ranging from disaster management to smart city are 
built on the Internet of Things (IoT) platform by 
deploying a number of smart sensors in a heterogeneous 
environment. The key requirements of such applications 
are the need of near real-time stream data processing in 
large scale sensing networks. This trend gives birth of 
an area called big data stream. One of the key problems 
in big data stream is to ensure the end-to-end security. 
To address this challenge, we proposed Dynamic Prime 
Number Based Security Verification (DPBSV) and 
Dynamic Key Length Based Security Framework 
(DLSeF) methods for big data streams based on the 
shared key derived from synchronized prime numbers in 
our earlier works. One of the major shortcomings of 
these methods is that they assume synchronization of the 
shared key. However, the assumption does not hold 
when the communication between Data Stream 
Manager (DSM) and sensing devices is broken. To 
address this problem, this paper proposes an adaptive 
technique to synchronize the shared key without 
communication between sensing devices and DSM, 
where sensing devices obtain the shared key re-
initialization properties from its neighbours. 
Theoretical analyses and experimental results show that 
the proposed technique can be integrated with our 
DPBSV and DLSeF methods without degrading the 
performance and efficiency. We observed that the 
proposed synchronization method also strengthens the 
security of the models. 
1. Introduction  
There are a large number of critical applications, 
such as large-scale sensor networks for environment 
sensing, disaster management, remote health 
monitoring and smart homes, that require near real-time 
data stream to be processed in datacentres for enabling 
data-driven decisions. These applications produce high 
volume, velocity data that should be processed in near-
real time to detect events such as heart-attacks in the 
context of remote health monitoring and telephony 
frauds in the context of telecommunication. These 
applications require a paradigm shift as compared to 
traditional store and process later approaches [1]. 
Clearly, traditional approaches cannot support near real-
time decision making. To address this near real-time 
decision making requirement, a new cloud-based 
computing paradigm based on Stream Processing 
Engines (SPEs) has evolved [4, 17, 18]. SPEs can 
process the data stream on the fly [15, 16] in contrast to 
store and process later approaches enabled by batch 
processing engines such as Apache Hadoop and 
Amazon Elastic MapReduce. The need of real-time 
processing for high volume and high velocity input data 
arises due to the need of real time detection of events in 
combination with the fact that the data cannot be 
persisted for later analysis for practical reasons (e.g., 
data storage overhead) [12]. SPEs can process data in 
near real-time, but they have security limitations as 
discussed next. In addition, Data Stream Manager 
(DSM) undertakes the security verification of the data 
blocks on-the-fly before SPEs. These features present 
significant opportunities and challenges in the area of 
data security and freshness of big data stream [11, 12]. 
Let us consider a Disaster Management (DM) 
application to motivate the end-to-end (i.e., from 
Sensing Devices to Cloud Data Centre processing layer) 
security problem that exists with the current generation 
of SPEs and relevant stream processing algorithmic 
approaches. DM applications rely on near real-time 
processing of sensor data in the cloud. Efficiency and 
effectiveness of decision making and event (e.g., 
flooding, tsunami, landslides etc.) detection in DM 
applications is dependent on the following security 
related properties of the sensor data including 
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and freshness. 
Any compromise on the above mentioned security 
related properties of data during processing and/or 
transmission will lead to inaccurate event detection and 
decision making. Ultimately this leads to the loss of 
lives and critical infrastructures. Hence, these 
applications require end-to-end security to increase the 
reliability of the data analysis pipelines.  
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 StreamShield is a stream centric architecture for 
security and privacy in data stream environments, where 
authors highlighted the requirement of security in data 
stream for the very first time [2]. Authors broadly 
divided the security issues in two parts (i.e. data security 
and query security) and both these security issues were 
applied for stream data analysis. Following this 
architecture, we identify four important requirements 
and properties for security verification of big data 
stream: (a) near real-time security verification, (b) 
dealing with high volume and velocity of data, (c) the 
data items should only be accessed once, and (d) the 
original data are not available for comparisons [11, 12, 
13, 14]. We focused on addressing big data stream 
security requirements by keeping all these big data 
stream constraints. We proposed a novel light weight 
security model by ensuring end-to-end security for big 
data streams. First, we proposed a Dynamic Prime 
Number Based Security Verification (DPBSV) scheme 
for big data stream processing, which is based on a 
common shared key that is updated dynamically by 
generating synchronized pairs of prime numbers [11, 
12]. Later to make it more efficient and reduce the 
computational overhead and buffer size, we proposed a 
Dynamic Key Length Based Security Framework 
(DLSeF) based on the shared key derived from 
synchronized prime numbers [13, 14]. These two 
techniques were proposed to maintain the end-to-end 
security of big sensing data stream and perform security 
verification at DSM.  
All these above security solutions follow the 
independent rekeying process without further 
communications between the source sensors and DSM 
after handshaking. However, it is impossible to continue 
the key update and data transmission without any 
interruptions in a hostile nature of source sensing area. 
Hence, the source side key generation synchronization 
is a major problem with above security solutions 
(DPBSV and DLSeF). In these models, a source node 
sends a request message to DSM to get the 
synchronization properties if there is any kind of key 
desynchronization, which is not an efficient way to get 
synchronization properties. By focusing on this 
problem, we propose a novel synchronization method in 
this paper in which source sensors get synchronization 
properties from their neighbours. As the sensing sources 
are distributed in a hostile environment and nodes do not 
have any neighbour/network information, it is a 
challenging task to identify the authenticated neighbour 
and retrieve the synchronization properties. The 
contributions of the paper is summarized as follows: 
• We present a synchronized shared key 
generation method.  
• We apply the synchronization method over 
DPBSV and DLSeF security architecture.   
• We evaluate the model both theoretically and 
empirically.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 details the related literature. Section 3 presents 
the problem statement for key synchronization in the big 
data stream based applications. Section 4 describes the 
proposed synchronization method and its association 
with DLSeF architecture. Section 5 presents the 
theoretical analysis, and section 6 evaluates the 
performance and efficiency of the method through 
experiments. Section 7 concludes the paper by outlining 
potential future works. 
2. Related works  
Ensuring the end-to-end security of big data streams 
has emerged as an important research topic in many 
stream processing applications such as disaster 
management, telephony fraud detection and credit card 
fraud detection. In this section, we describe related 
works that cover the research areas such as stream 
processing, and secure authentication of neighbours. 
Stonebraker et al. [1] outlined eight core features 
that a framework or system must possess in order to be 
able to efficiently handle stream processing workloads. 
These core features include (i) the continuous flow 
nature of data stream, (ii) handling the data 
imperfection, (iii) maintaining the data security, (iv) 
integrated store and stream data, (v) partition and scale 
applications automatically, (vi) query processing on 
streams, (vii) expectations of query outcomes and (viii) 
process and respond instantaneously. Our aim is to 
ensure the data safety (iii) and availability (viii) features 
of big data streams. Nehme et al. initially proposed an 
architecture by addressing the needs of data security and 
query security in streaming environments [2]. They 
proposed a continuous access control architecture, 
named StreamShield, which ensures query security. 
However, StreamShield is unable to ensure end-to-end 
data security of streams.   
Arasu et al. proposed a Data Stream Management 
System (DSMS), called STanford stREam data 
Manager (STREAM) [4]. It is intended to deal with high 
velocity data rates and substantial numbers of 
continuous queries through adaptive resource 
allocation; however, STREAM cannot ensure data 
security properties. Similar to STREAM, StreamCloud 
is a large scalable elastic data streaming system for 
processing large data stream in cloud [3].  
Sung et al. describes an identification based node 
authentication, which can be used to solve key 
agreement problem in a three-layer interaction of sensor 
networks [8]. Authors consider the characteristics, 
architecture, and vulnerability of the sensors, and 
provides an ID-based node authentication scheme. An 
Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) based 
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 authentication protocol has been proposed in WSN [9] 
for device authentication. Khan et al. [10] showed the 
M.L. Das-scheme’s security pitfalls and proposed an 
improvement and security patches that attempt to fix the 
susceptibilities of this scheme. Both of the above are a 
secure authentication protocol but are computationally 
rich, which do not follow the big data stream properties 
as stated in the Introduction section. Park [24] explained 
an interesting technique to get the time stamp from 
neighbours for robustness to clock skews among nodes. 
The neighbour is authenticated to get the 
synchronization properties. In [25], a sensor classified 
its neighbours based on the geographic location and 
communicated to the trusted neighbours. Our network 
structure is different from other network structure by 
considering DSM as a centralized processor; so we need 
a new solution for our model. In this paper, we propose 
a new synchronization method on the above DPBSV 
and DLSeF models. 
3. Problem statement  
Security of big sensing data stream is a major issue 
for several applications including disaster management, 
emergency management, event detections etc. [12]. By 
considering these applications, DPBSV and DLSeF are 
two security solutions proposed to maintain the end-to-
end security in big sensing data stream. In both of these 
models, source sensor devices and DSM never 
communicate between themselves after handshaking. 
During handshaking process, DSM sends the key 
generation properties to source sensors and the sensors 
save the sensitive key generation properties in secure 
module of the sensor such as TPM. The TPM is a 
dedicated security chip following the Trust Computing 
standard specification for cryptographic microcontroller 
systems [23]. TPM provides a cost effective way of 
“hardening” many recently deployed applications, those 
are previously based on software encryption algorithms 
with keys kept on a host’s disk [19, 23]. It provides a 
hardware based trust, which contains cryptographic 
functionality like key generation, store, and 
management in hardware. So source sensor performs the 
rekeying process independently. The above security 
solutions follow these methods to satisfy the big data 
stream properties (from Introduction Section). Here, 
synchronization in shared key generation between the 
source and DSM is a major issue and needs to be solved. 
The complete architecture of data flows from source 
sensing device to cloud datacenter with possible attacks 
is shown in Figure 1. We refer to [8] for further 
information on stream data processing in cloud. 
To address these issues and make the security 
solutions more efficient, we propose a novel 
synchronization technique for big data stream. 
Authentication of neighbour nodes to get the keys, clock 
skew, and other properties are very common for wireless 
sensor networks [24, 25]. We use a similar method with 
minor modifications according to our network structure 
to get the key synchronization properties from 
neighbours. Different network structures use different 
properties such as cluster head or group key or base 
station information, for neighbour node authentication 
[26, 27]. According to our network structure, all sources 
have DSM properties along with the current time 
interval. So we use these properties for neighbour 
authentication. We follow the method to get the 
properties from neighbours because all source sensors 
use the same key in the given time interval to perform 
the encryption. There are two major synchronisation 
issues that need to be addressed for DPBSV and DLSeF 
model: (a) time synchronization (follow particular time 
to start the key generation process), and (b) the 
synchronisation of the shared key when source sensor 
missed the current key because of a malicious activity 
or natural hazards.  
As the source sensing area is distributed in nature 
and the source performs the shared key generation 
independently, time to start the key generation is a 
challenging and important issue for security models. In 
any hazardous situations, sensors may miss the shared 
keys or key synchronization. Because of the TPM 
properties, key generation properties remain safe in 
sensors. So sensors only need the key generation 
properties to restart synchronize key generation and 
send data blocks to DSM.  
Figure 1. Overlay architecture of sensing 
device to cloud data processing center, and 
possible attacks during data flow. 
4. Proposed synchronization method 
Our security model is motivated by the concept of 
moving target defense. The basic idea is that the keys 
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 are the targets of attacks by attackers. To avoid such 
problems in big sensing data streams, we proposed 
novel techniques such as DPBSV [12] and DLSeF [14]. 
In these models, if an intruder/ attacker eventually hacks 
the key, the data and time period is selected in such a 
way that he/she cannot predict the key or its length for 
the next session. In such models, there are two major 
synchronisation issues that need to be addressed: (a) the 
precise time to start the key generation process (time 
synchronization) and (b) the synchronisation of the 
shared key as discussed before. While addressing the 
synchronisation issues, it is important to note that no 
compromise is made on the authenticity, integrity and 
partial confidentiality (maintain confidentiality in real 
time) of the data, which are important to make decision 
from the collected data. In this paper, we have addressed 
the initial process synchronization properties with the 
lost shared key synchronization over DLSeF model.  
Table 1. Notations used in our model 
Acronym Description 
𝑆𝑖   i
th source sensing device’s ID. 
Di DSM  ID 
𝐾𝑖 i
th source device’s secret key. 
𝐾𝑠𝑖  i
th source device’s session key. 
𝑘𝑙 Key length  
𝐾𝑆𝐻 Secret shared key at sensor and DSM 
𝐾𝑆𝐻− Previous secret shared key. 
𝑟 Pseudo random number.  
𝑡 Interval time to generate the prime 
number. 
𝑇 Timestamp added with data blocks. 
T′ Current time  
T′′ Time to start the process.  
𝑃𝑖 Random prime number. 
𝐾𝑑 Secret key of the DSM. 
𝐼𝐷 Data for integrity check. 
𝐴𝐷 Secret key for authenticity check. 
𝐸( ) Encryption function. 
𝐻( ) One-way hash function. 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖) Prime number generation function. 
KeyGen Key generation procedure. 
Key-Length 
( ) 
Key length selection procedure.  
⊕ Bitwise X-OR operation. 
∥ Concatenation operation. 
RQA Authentication request message. 
RPA Authentication response message. 
Similar to DPBSV and DLSeF security solutions 
[11, 12, 13, 14], we added synchronisation processes 
(both time synchronization and key synchronization) to 
them with the standard steps: system setup, 
handshaking, rekeying, key synchronization and 
security verification. We follow DLSeF system setup, 
handshaking, rekeying model with minor modifications 
before synchronization properties are described. Table 1 
provides the notations used in modelling our method. 
We next describe the proposed method.   
 
Figure 2. Secure authentication between 
Sensor and DSM during system setup (from 
DLSeF model [13]). 
4.1. System setup  
In this step, we assume that DSM has all deployed 
sensing device’s identities (IDs) and respective secret 
keys because the network is untrusted and hostile in 
nature. Sensing devices and DSM implement some 
common primitives such as hash function (i.e. H( )), and 
common key (K1- K4), which are executed during the 
initial identification and system setup steps.  
The proposed authentication process follows the 
DLSeF authentication phase that includes five different 
steps [13, 14]. The first three steps are for the sensing 
device and DSM authentication process and the final 
two steps are for the session key generation process as 
shown in Figure 2. The session key (Ksi) is utilized 
during the handshaking process which was generated 
during the system setup step. 
We keep the hashing and shared key at the source 
sensor to use in future for data encryption and neighbour 
authentication (refer Figure 2). We are using the trusted 
part of sensors (i.e. TPM) to keep the secret information 
of source sensors [19].  
4.2. Handshaking  
In the handshaking process, the DSM sends the key 
generation and synchronization properties to sensors 
based on their individual session key (Ksi) established 
earlier during authentication process.  
The dynamic prime number generation function 
computes the relative prime number, which always 
depends on the previous prime number [13]. It is also 
already proved that the generated number will always be 
prime number and synchronized between source devices 
and DSM [13].  We follow DLSeF method for rekeying 
time interval according to the key length.  
DSM sends a time chunk, i.e., T′′ along with other 
properties i.e. 𝐾𝑑, 𝑡, , 𝑃𝑖,
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 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 ( ), 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ( ),  𝐾𝑆𝐻, 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛 [11, 12, 13, 
14]. This time stamp (T′′) is used at source to initialize 
the key generation process and sent the encrypted data 
blocks to the DSM. If any sources missed the time stamp 
to initialize the process, it will send request to DSM to 
get the time stamp again. New sources joining to the 
network need to follow the step to start the key 
generation/ rekeying process.  
Si ← DSM: { 𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑖(𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡, T
′′, 𝑃𝑖 ,
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 ( ), 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ( ), 𝐾𝑆𝐻 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛)}  
All of these above transferred information are stored 
in the trusted part of source for future rekeying process 
(e.g., TPM) [19].   
Table 2. Time taken by symmetric key (AES) 
algorithm to get all possible keys using the 
most advanced Intel i7 processor. 
Key Length 32 64 128 
Key domain size 4.295e+
09 
1.845e 
+19 
3.4028e
+38 
Time (in 
nanoseconds) 
7.301e+
09 
3136e 
+19 
5.7848e
+35 
4.3. Rekeying  
Our proposed method not only calculates the 
dynamic prime number to update the shared key without 
further communication after handshaking, but also 
dynamically change the key length at sensor and DSM. 
We follow the DLSeF Rekeying process to ensure that 
the protocol remains secured [13]. According to the 
properties of the TPM, no one have access to contents 
which is stored inside the TPM. Only the corresponding 
sensor can access TPM properties [19]. From the 
Handshaking process, sensors are aware of the Prime 
(Pi), KeyLength, and KeyGen. Now we describe the 
complete rekeying process by using those functions and 
keys from DLSeF model. The synchronized dynamic 
prime number Pi is generated on both ends, i.e., sensors 
and DSM [13], to be used for the rekeying process. Now 
sensors need to wait for the time T′′ to start the key 
generation process. 
ALGORITHM 1. Key Generation (Rekeying) Process  
1. Dynamic prime number Prime (𝑃𝑖) [13]. 
2. Following DLSeF method [13]: 
2.1 t (time interval) = {t1, t2, t3, …} 
Here t1, t2, t3, … are the time interval for 
rekeying. (32/64/128-bit key from DLSeF) 
2.2 At time (t), 𝑆𝑖 and D compute 𝐾𝑆𝐻= 
𝐸𝐾𝑆𝐻(H(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑑)).  
2.3 After time (t), reinitialize from Step 1. 
3. The encryption process at sensor as follows 
3.1 𝐼𝐷=𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻 // For integrity check 
3.2 𝐴𝐷=𝑆𝑖⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻 // For Authentication check 
4. Si → DSM: {(ID∥(AD∥T))}// Data format to DSM 
 
By following DLSeF model, sensors generate the 
shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻=(𝐸(𝑃𝑖,𝐾𝑑)) using the prime number 𝑃𝑖, 
and DSM’s secret key 𝐸(P𝑖,𝐾𝑑). We use the secret key 
of DSM to improve the robustness of the security 
verification process and fixed the initial key length as 64 
bits. The data blocks divided into two different parts, 
i.e., authentication and integrity verification. One is 
encrypted DATA based on shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 for integrity 
checking (i.e., 𝐼𝐷=𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻), and the other part is 
for the authenticity checking (i.e., 𝐴𝐷=𝑆𝑖⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻). The 
resulting data block ((DAT𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻) ∥ (𝑆𝑖⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻)) is sent 
to DSM as follows:  
Si → DSM: {(𝐼𝐷∥(𝐴𝐷∥T))}.  
The procedure of rekeying process is shown in 
Algorithm 1.  
 
Figure 3. Neighbour node discover to get the 
current state of key generation properties. 
 
Figure 4. Neighbour discovery to get the key 
synchronization properties with all possible 
conditions.  (a) node Si sends RQA message to 
all its one-hop neighbours; (b) the sender 
receives the RPA of individual RQA; (c) Si send 
ACK to only authenticated synchronized 
neighbours; (d) node Si receives the 
synchronization properties. 
4.4. Key synchronization  
Synchronization is one of the major issues during the 
rekeying process between sensors and DSM, as they are 
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 not interacting after handshaking process. The shared 
key synchronization is based on the initial key 
generation process followed by the rekeying. So the 
initial key synchronization is to make a common time to 
start the key generation process. In our model, DSM 
works as a centralize controller. So DSM initiates the 
key generation process. As defined before, during the 
handshaking process DSM sends back to the source (Si) 
with a time stamp T′′ to initialize the key generation 
process.  
There are potentially two cases (i) sensor starts the 
process on time to maintain synchronization; (ii) sensor 
may be missing the time stamp T′′ or later receives the 
key generation properties after time stamp. In the second 
case, source sensor send request to get the next time 
stamp for key generation process.  
There are several reasons for sensors to be out of 
sync such as inability of the source node to generate the 
shared key by some computational overhead or by any 
natural disaster or by any malicious activity. Even if a 
sensor missed the synchronization, it does not miss the 
key generation properties because of the TPM features 
[19]. In such cases, the source sensor (Si) gets 
synchronization properties from its neighbours. 
According to the source network structure, sensors do 
not have neighbour information. So it’s a challenging 
task to identify the neighbours and get the key 
synchronization properties. The procedure to obtain 
shared key properties from unknown neighbours is 
given below.  
4.4.1. Initial setup. Let us assume that sensor (Si) 
missed the synchronization. The Sensor (Si) computes a 
Pseudo Random Number, i.e., PRN(r), using the current 
prime number (Pi) and the shared key (KSH) to generate 
the authentication request message (RQA) i.e. RQA ← 
H(EKSH(r ∥ Pi ∥ Kd)). Then the resultant RQA, DSM ID 
(Di) and time stamp (T) encrypt with mutual key K4 
from the system setup steps (EK4(RQA ∥ T ∥ Di)) (refer 
to Figure 2). We use this key for encryption because all 
the authenticated nodes have this key from DSM during 
the system setup phase.    
4.4.2. Synchronization phase. The out of sync sensor 
(Si) broadcasts this to its one-hop neighbours. When the 
neighbour sensors receive the information, it decrypts 
with its mutual key i.e. K4 (DK4(RQA ∥ T ∥ Di)). It 
compares the received time frame (T) with its current 
time (T′) to check the data freshness and avoid the replay 
attack (T - T′ ≤ ΔT). If the time difference is less then 
ΔT, then it accepts the data packet; otherwise it is 
discarded. Here ΔT is the average time required to 
transmit data packet between source and DSM. 
The neighbour node (denoted as Sj) compares the 
received DSM ID with its own DSM ID to validate the 
source as the authenticated one. To make the 
authentication process stronger, we perform two layer 
encryption of the request (RQA). Sensor (Sj) perform 
the hash and decrypt the second layer with the shared 
key (KSH), i.e. H(DKSH(r ∥ Pi ∥ Kd)). It uses previous 
shared key if the shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻−  is modified in the 
meantime and compares the DSM ID by retrieving it 
using the DSM secret key (Di← retriveKey(Kd)).   
After authentication process, Sj prepares 
authentication response message (RPA) by including its 
own ID, DSM ID and pseudo random number r (RPA ← 
EKSH(Sj ∥ Di ∥ r)). It then encrypts the RPA along with 
DSM key and time stamp by using the same key K4 
(EK4(RPA ∥ Kd ∥ T)).  
Once Si receives the RPA, it is processed in the same 
way to authenticate the node Sj (DK4(RPA ∥ Kd ∥ T)). 
First it compares the time to avoid replay attack (T - T′ 
≤ ΔT) and compares the DSM ID (Di← retriveKey(Kd)) 
and value of r to perform authentication. Here 
desynchronized source node (Si) encounters three 
different types of neighbours: malicious node, 
desynchronized authenticated node and synchronized 
authenticated node as shown in Figure 4. Malicious 
neighbours cannot decrypt Si request because it is 
encrypted by the secret key. But a desynchronized 
authenticated node can read the request. Once it came to 
know that the source (Si) is seeking the key 
synchronization properties, it sends the response with its 
desynchronization indication. The source discards the 
RPA received from such nodes. If the source node 
receives RPA from authenticated synchronised 
neighbour, Si choses such node by sending the ACK in 
order to get the key synchronization properties 
(EKSH(ACK ∥ Si ∥ T)).  
This acknowledgement message (i.e. ACK) confirms 
the mutual authentication between the source and  
synchronised neighbour to obtain the key 
synchronization properties (DKSH(ACK ∥ Si ∥ T)). After 
receiving the acknowledgement message, the 
authenticated neighbour gets the source node ID and 
sends the shared key properties (Pi, KSH, t) to source 
node as EKSH(Pi, KSH, t, T). 
When the desynchronized source gets the shared key 
synchronization properties (DKSH(Pi, KSH, t, T)), it can 
generate the shared key by itself, because it has the 
prime number (Pi), shared key (KSH), and time to change 
the next key (t). Every time we are checking the time 
interval in order to avoid the replay and DoS attacks. 
The stepwise representation of the neighbour 
authentication to obtain the shared key properties is 
shown in Figure 3.  
4.4.3. New node synchronization. If there is a new 
source node joining to the network, then it starts the 
authentication process with DSM to get the key 
generation properties. After receiving the key 
generation properties from DSM, the node (n) either 
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 starts the process or authenticate with the neighbour 
nodes to compare the synchronization properties. 
4.5. Security verification  
In this step, the DSM first checks the authenticity in 
each individual data block 𝐴𝐷 and then the integrity 
with the randomly selected data blocks 𝐼𝐷. Here data 
block is divided into two blocks for authenticity 
checking and integrity checking. Along with 
authenticity checking, we add timestamp (T) in order to 
get the data freshness and avoid replay attack. We 
change the security verification for data integrity in 
random interval of data packets according to the DLSeF 
properties [13, 14]. We prefer to change the integrity 
verification interval that is directly proportional to the 
shared key length because the key length is inversely 
proportional to the possibilities of data accessible. The 
data block at DSM for security verification is 
represented as: {(𝐼𝐷∥(𝐴𝐷∥T))}. DSM first checks the 
authentication part to get the timestamp. It compares its 
own timestamp with the received one i.e. T - T′ ≤ ΔT. If 
the time interval is less than or equal to the predefined 
time ΔT, then it accepts the data; otherwise it is rejected. 
This will help to maintain the data freshness and avoid 
the replay attack. Initial time checking and the 
authenticated source checking can avoid the DoS (denial 
of service) attack. Another important advantage of 
adding the time stamp (T) is to get the shared key used 
for the encryption process. If the shared key is updated 
after receiving the data block encryption, then DSM 
uses the previous shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻−) for decrypting the 
data instead of current key (𝐾𝑆𝐻). 
We are updating the shared key before the possible 
attacks. For the authenticity check, the DSM decrypts 
𝐴𝐷 with shared key 𝑆𝑖=𝐴𝐷⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻. Once Si is obtained, 
the DSM checks its source database and extracts the 
corresponding secret key 𝐾𝑖 (𝐾𝑖 ← 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝐾𝑒𝑦(𝑆𝑖 )). 
In the integrity check process, the DSM decrypts the 
selected data such as 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴=𝐼𝐷⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻 to get the 
original data and checks MAC for the data integrity.   
5. Theoretical analysis 
This section provides a theoretical analysis of our 
proposed model to show that the proposed 
synchronization method works efficiently by getting the 
shared key properties from the neighbours. We also 
apply the synchronization properties over DPBSV and 
DLSF and prove that the models are safe against the 
network attacks. Proposed synchronization method 
never interrupt the shared key generation at sensors.  
We have made a number of practical and realistic 
assumption in our method. In the following, we first 
describe those assumptions. 
Assumption 1. In our method, the data that was 
encrypted by a symmetric-key algorithm cannot be 
decrypted by any parties, unless they have the 
session/shared key.  
Assumption 2. Shared key (KSH) calculation 
procedures reside inside trusted parts of the sensor (like 
TPM) so that no one is authorized to access and 
manipulate them [12].  
We define our threat model, which is similar to the 
most cryptologic analyses, to the shared key properties 
as follows:  
Theorem 1. According to the proposed synchronization 
method, the shared key (KSH) is always synchronized 
between Source sensor (Si) and DSM. 
Proof: We are following the DLSeF security 
verification model and added the shared 
synchronization properties to it. According to DLSeF 
properties, the dynamic shared key length varies in 32 
bit, 64 bit, and 128 bit; these keys are updated both 
source and DSM ends. The shared key is updated 
without further communications between Si and DSM 
after handshaking. A variation in key length introduces 
a complexity to the attackers to predict the next shared 
key. The ECRYPT II recommendations on key length 
say that a 128-bit symmetric key provides the same 
strength of protection as a 3,248-bit asymmetric key. 
Advanced processor (Intel i7 Processor) took about 1.7 
nanoseconds to try out one key from one block. With 
this speed, it would take about 1.3 × 1012× the age of 
the universe to check all the keys from the possible key 
set [22]. All the related key domain and the time 
required to get the possible keys by using Inter i7 
processor are listed in Table 2. We follow the DLSeF 
model to select the key lengths [13]. 
Here, we are highlighting the synchronization in two 
places (i) source sensor with DSM at initial key 
generation process and (ii) while obtaining the 
synchronization properties from neighbour. For the first 
option (during the handshaking process), DSM sends 
the key generation properties to Si along with the 
timestamp (T′′) to set the key generation time. Then both 
DSM and Si generate the shared key with dynamic 
length and interval as in DLSeF method. This means the 
shared key will be synchronized at both ends. In second 
option (obtaining the synchronization properties from 
neighbours), if any of the source desynchronized, it 
initiates the neighbour authentication process to 
discover authenticated synchronized neighbour (see 
Figure 3). After authentication, neighbour sends the key 
generation properties EKSH(Pi, KSH, t, T), where T is for 
data freshness and t is the start of the key generation 
process. Then source Si can use the current key and use 
these properties to update the next key (i.e. 
𝐾𝑆𝐻=(𝐸(𝑃𝑖,𝐾𝑑))) after time t. Now source Si became 
synchronize with other sources and DSM.  
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 Theorem 2. After applying synchronization, security 
verification models (DPBSV and DLSeF) are protected 
against authentication, integrity and partially 
confidentiality. 
Proof: Please refer to [11, 12] for the attack 
properties associated with DPBSV model and [13, 14] 
with the DLSeF model. By considering TPM properties, 
we know that an attacker cannot get the secret 
information (Pi, Ki, KSH) or the key generation properties 
(KeyGen). During the neighbourhood authentication 
procss, a sensor (Si) shares the synchronization 
properties after authentication and gets the DSM ID and 
the secret key (see Figure 3). So there are no possibilities 
for the malicious nodes to trap authenticated sensors to 
get the shared key generation properties. Following 
neighbour synchronization properties, malicious nodes 
cannot interfere because neighbours identify each other 
through the DSM ID (Kd) and the encryption process 
uses the secret key (EK4). Those properties are not 
known to malicious nodes. We know that an intruder 
cannot get the currently used KSH within the time 
interval t (see Table 2), because our proposed method 
calculates Pi randomly after time interval t and then uses 
the value Pi to generate KSH. But an attacker can 
introduce itself as an authenticated node to send packets.   
We know that DPBSV [11] and DLSeF [13] are 
protected against authentication, integrity and partially 
confidentiality. From above, we conclude that, an 
attacker cannot get the shared key information during 
neighbour synchronization. By combining the above 
two we conclude that the security verification models 
are safe after including the synchronization properties. 
Theorem 3. After applying the synchronization, the 
security verification models avoid replay attacks. 
Proof: There are potentially two places for replay 
attacks (i) during the neighbour authentication; (ii) the 
security verification at DSM.  In both of these cases we 
are adding a time stamp i.e. T in packets. During the 
security verification at DSM, DSM checks for the data 
freshness by comparing the time interval between the 
sent and received time of data blocks such as T - T′ ≤ 
ΔT. If the interval is less than or equal to ΔT, then the  
data block is accepted; otherwise it is rejected. 
Application of this rule keeps rejecting the delayed data 
packets. but maintains the data freshness and avoids the 
replay attacks. Through the time interval (ΔT), it is easy 
for DSM to find the shared key used for encryption 
(𝐾𝑆𝐻− or KSH). We also follow the same method to avoid 
replay attack during neighbour authentication. By using 
such method, our model is proven to be more efficient 
to avoid the DoS attacks. 
6. Experiment and evaluation 
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
key synchronization method under the adverse 
conditions, we validate our proposed method in a well-
established security protocol simulation environment. 
We first verify the security method using Scyther [5], 
and then measure the efficiency of the same in the JCE 
(Java Cryptographic Environment) [6]. Finally, we 
check the performance of security aware sensor data 
encryption and sensor node performance in COOJA 
simulator provided by Contiki OS [7].   
6.1. Security verification  
The proposed method for synchronized shared key 
is implemented in the Scyther simulation environment 
using the Security Protocol Description Language 
(.spdl). The efficacy of the proposed security is 
observed for two important instances (i) during the 
security verification at DSM and (ii) during neighbour 
authentication process. According to the features of 
Scyther, Si is the sender (i.e., source sensor), Sj is the 
neighbour of Si (neighbour authentication) and D is the 
recipient (i.e., DSM). Apart from these, we follow the 
default properties of Scyther. Many types of 
cryptographic attack can be considered in our simulation 
context. In our case, we focus on integrity, 
authentication, data confidentiality (in real time), and 
replay attacks as discussed above. We used Scyther, an 
automatic security protocols verification tool, for 
verifying our model.  
 
Figure 5. Secure authentication results. 
 
Figure 6. Security verifications results at DSM. 
Results: We did our simulation using variable 
numbers of data blocks in each run. Our experiment 
ranges from 10 to 100 instances with the intervals of 10. 
During the neighbour authentication, both sensors Si 
and Sj authenticate themselves while hiding the DSM 
ID and secret key. In the experiment, we did not 
encounter any attacks that can compromise the security 
6018
 properties of the big data streams. Results shown in 
Figure 5 validate the above hypothesis; it also and shows 
the neighbour authentication in the Scyther 
environment. As stated in [13], we perform the security 
verification at DSM; here, we follow the same concept 
while adding the new key synchronization process. 
Figure 6 shows the results of the security verification at 
DSM after combining the synchronization method with 
DLSeF. 
 
Figure 7. Performance of security verification 
at DSM. 
6.2. Performance comparison 
 The performance comparison experiment is carried out 
in JCE (Java Cryptographic Environment). The 
performance is based on the features of JCE in java 
virtual machine version 1.6 64 bit. JCE is the standard 
extension to the java platform which provides a 
framework implementation for cryptographic methods. 
We have performed experiments with different sizes of 
data blocks by applying the synchronization over 
DLSeF and named as MS-DLSeF (DLSeF modified for 
synchronization). We also applied the same 
synchronization proprieties over DPBSV and named as 
MS-DPBSV (DPBSV modified for synchronization). 
The results of our experiments are shown in Figure 7. 
We compare the performance of our proposed method 
over DLSeF (MS-DLSeF) and DPBSV (MS- DPBSV) 
with the advanced encryption standard (AES) [20, 21], 
DPBSV [11, 12] and DLSeF [13, 14]. Apart from the 
neighbour synchronization we follow the properties of 
DPBSV and DLSeF. From Figure 7, it is clear that the 
synchronization method does not degrade the 
performance of DPBSV and DLSeF in terms of security 
verification speed.  
6.3. Sensor node performance 
 We experimented with the performance of the sensors 
in terms of the overheads involved while computing 
synchronized shared keys in COOJA simulator provided 
by Contiki OS [7]. We modelled the two most common 
types of sensor, i.e., Z1 and Trotsky. A Z1 sensor node 
is equipped with the low power microcontroller 
MSP430F2617, which features a powerful 16-bit RISC 
CPU @16 MHz clock speed, built-in clock factory 
calibration, 8 KB RAM and a 92 KB Flash memory. 
TmoteSky is an ultra-low power sensor, and it is 
equipped with the low power microcontroller 
MSP430F1611, which has a built-in clock factory 
calibration, a 10 KB RAM and a 48 KB Flash memory.  
 
 
(a) Energy for 
neighbour 
authentication 
(b) Energy for 
security 
verification  
Figure 8. Energy consumption by using 
COOJA in Contiki OS. 
In this experiment, we measured the performance of 
sensors while they transmit/receive information from 
neighbours or dynamically update the shared key for 
undertaking security verification process. Figure 8 (a) 
shows the energy required by sensors during 
transmitting/receiving synchronization properties from 
neighbours and Figure 8 (b) shows the power 
consumption behaviours for the key generation process. 
From these experiments, we conclude that our proposed 
method is lightweight as both the application of   
synchronization properties and security verification 
model consume very little sensor battery power.  
From the above experiments, we conclude that our 
proposed method is secured and efficient in term of 
security verification speed.  
7. Conclusion and future works 
In this paper, we proposed a shared key 
synchronization method to ensure an end-to-end 
security in big data stream processing system consisting 
of distributed sensors and cloud-hosted stream 
processing engines (DSM). The proposed 
synchronization technique was implemented and 
verified in our previously proposed DPBSV and DLSeF 
security verification method for big data streams.  In 
these previous models, sensors and DSM update their 
shared key independently without requiring further 
communication after handshaking phase. Proposed 
method synchronize the shared key without 
communication between sensing devices and DSM, 
where sensing devices obtain the shared key re-
initialization properties from its neighbours. By 
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 theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations, we 
showed that our proposed synchronization method 
successfully scales within the DPBSV and DLSeF 
models. In our future work, we will implement the 
proposed model in a real IoT application that requires 
near real-time decision making. We will further improve 
our techniques to meet the requirements of dynamic IoT 
networks. 
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